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lc This hurriedly prepared not? discusses first the social 
impact of oil in mainly agricultural countries, and then the 
relevance of this experience to Britain, especially Scotland,
It is not my purpose here to explore in depth all these 
interactions, still less to analyse the problems of any 
particular OPEC member; it is to provide an introduction to 
the consideration of the likely social impact of oil in 
Scotland, I shall therefore sketch in a summary way the more- 
or-less common experience of a dozen established oil producers, 
only quoting a few examples to illustrate various points.
2. There are some characteristics of petroleum that make 
petroleum exporting countries a special class. The main one 
is that petroleum is exhaustible. This means that the period 
of exploitation needs to be used to create a socio-economic 
structure that will be viable after its end « what the 
Venezuelans call "sembrar el petroleo". Yet the interplay
of the economic and political characteristics of a petroleum 
exporter paradoxically make this particularly hard, perhaps 
impossible to achieve.
3. Secondly, petroleum generates very high incomes pGr 
employee and thus also high foreign exchange earnings, 
compared to other sectors, especially agriculture. When 
commercially feasible petroleum is discovered, it comes as a 
major and sudden intrusion into any socio-economic structure 
that is characteristically mainly rural and marked by the 
typical social evils of undernourishment, illiteracy, poor 
health, bad housing, etc.and by typical economic dependence on 
the exchange of agricultural products for manufactures. 
Venezuela in 19^0 or Nigeria in I960 are cases in point. Such a 
structure may well be strained by a labour force growing too 
fast to be absorbed in productive employment - which is held
in check by shortage of capital and inadequate foreign exchange
to buy technical and material inputs. There is some
* flexibility in this traditional t pe of structure. Its
adj'ustment may be -helped, for example, by the devaluation 
of the exchange rate, which
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in conjunction with rather slowly climbing wages, cheapens 
labour relative to that of industrial countries, stimulatinq 
output and encouraging the adoption of labour-intensive 
techniques. Still the policy problems are formidable, and 
the task of achieving a tolerable society with modern living 
standards seems very difficult.
4. It is no wonder, therefore, that the discovery of 
petroleum appears to offer a miraculous end to the problems 
of underdevelopment'. The shortages of capital and foreign 
exchange, seen as the crucial constraints, are suddenly eased.
5. Petroleum incomes are injected into the economy in two 
distinct ways. One is the direct expenditure of the petroleum 
companies in the exploration, development and operation of the 
sector. This partly takes the form of salaries and wages, 
partly of purchases of materials, power, etc.
6. This first type of impact is a relatively minor one for a
large country (though it may be important in particular areas).
It is true that wages are high, because employees have strategic 
power in such a profitable industry. But few people are employed 
especially after the development phase is over: production is
essentially a matter of turning taps on the pipelines (and even 
that is mechanised). Moreover the oil companies usually do 
not buy much locally, partly for the reason that there is little 
capacity to produce equipment. Because of the high requirements 
of experience and skill, the bulk of the salar ics are in the hands 
of expatriates who purchase mostly imports, even of foddstuffs.
7. The main source for the creation of jobs and incomes is 
the other channel through which oil generates incomes, the 
spending of government oil revenues. In the first place, the 
bureaucracy becomes heavily swollen, and also highly paid. 
Governments with "money to spare" cannot easily resist the 
pressure of the unemployed for Jobs or of the civil services 
unions for higher salaries. Secondly, the government uses the mom 
for "social" infrastructure « especially schools and hospitals.
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Thirdly, except in the mini~states, it tries to promote
industry and agriculture through development
coroporations, infrastructural investment, etc. and also
by supplying credi^/cheap fuel (especially natural gas). This 
is done in the framework of a national development plan.
8. It may, however, find problems in administering the 
injection of large sums into production. It lacks the 
expertise to judge what sort of industrial products it wants 
to manufacture or what would be the most appropriate 
technique for doing so. This is shown by the passive role it 
plays towards foreign investment « it waits for the salesmen 
to check in at the local Hilton, and then concedes accelerated 
amortization allowances, "tax holidays", monopoLy rights, etc. 
etc. , often quite uncritically. If it was in control of its
industrialisation, its officials would be conducting the 
negotiations in the head offices of the corporations that 
interested them - and exacting a high price for access to its 
lucrative market.
9. Moreover, and here lies the root of the paradox of the 
petroleum economy, it runs into special obstacles due to the 
very existence of fie petroleum sector. One is that the 
exchange rate becomes and remains overvalued, because the 
foreign exchange earnings are so plentiful; imports of 
industrial and agricultural products become artificially cheap 
at the expense of local producers, and while these
can be protected by high tariffs, it is not so easy to deal 
with another serious consequnce, that the country’s own products 
become too dear to export.
10. This can be seen in the continued dependence on 
petroleum. The long-established petroleum producers show 
little capacity for developing other exports, despite years 
of heavy investments, as the table on the next page shows.
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Table: Petroleum as a proportion of total exports
in traditional exporters, 1955 and 1972
(percentages)
1955 1972
Iran 74* 86
Iraq 91 91
Venezuela 94 93
Sources: International Financial Statistics (IMF);
Annual Statistical Bulletin (OPEf);
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (UN); 
Petroleo y otros datos estadisticos (Venezuela)
* Somewhat lowered then by the repercussions of 
the confrontation with the multinational 
corporations (the figure for 1966? was 86).
11. In addition, wages paid in the petroleum and government 
sectors are emulated elsewhere, setting levels that inhibit
the development, or even the continuation, of labour-intensive 
activities. The new industrial sector consists largely of 
factories making products which take advantage of the ready 
supply of capital and energy, or of oil (or natural gas) as a 
material - steel, cement, refined petroleum, petrochemicals,
fertilisers. Around this nucleus of heavy industry grows the 
'screwdriver* assembly industries typical of protected industrial 
structures - vehicles, household durables, etc., but in a more
exaggerated form than elsewhere. The only agriculture that 
flourishes is highly mechanised.
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o What is notable about this group of industries is that 
they too, like the petroleum sector, pay high wages but provide 
remarkably little employment. In fact petroleum economies are, 
contrary to what one might expect in view of their fast growth, 
characterised by heavy and chronic underemployment. Some of 
this is "open" ^ , but "disguised" unemployment is also common 
in the form of needless jobs in ministries and public 
corporations.
13. While part of the explanation for this lies in the failure 
of employment to expand in the goods-producing sectors, part 
can be found in a fast growth of population and the rapid 
migration to the capital and the petroleum area from the 
countryside. The government usually finds that the 
easiest way to keep unemployment in check is by large-scale 
public works programmes in these areas,especially roadbuilding 
- which paradoxically increases migration to the towns and thus 
aggravates unemployment.
14. The social picture in most countries today is one of 
extreme contrasts - between apartment blocks and shacks, but 
more profoundly between "modern" and "traditional" cultures.
They are especially marked in petroleum countries. Because 
foreigners, usually United States citizens, play a conspicuous 
part as technicians and consultants in the modern sector
the whole life style of the natives in this 
sector becomes a copy of that of the middle class of the United 
States, with large automobiles, etc. At the same time, the 
traditional culture gets drained of its talent and self-respect, 
with for example traditional songs and dances preserved (in a 
stylish form) as ’folklore1 turns in night clubs.
15* All countries suffer in a degree social dislocations due to 
industrialisation. Religious and other customs become weakened 
and formalised; material acquisitiveness grows. This is all 
much more noticeable in petroleum countries, however, because 
of the speed,of the economic change. One specially severe
1) i.e. it takes the form of seeking work. In Trinidad, where 
regular and good labour force surveys are carried out, the rate 
of open unemployment has been in the range of 12%-15%.
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sympton is crime. Part cf this originates within officialdom - 
bribes for concessions and contracts, nepotism in appointments, 
made possible by the riches which are generated by oil. Part 
of it lies outside, especially delinquency among youths who 
are excluded (whether by lack of education or of connections) 
from sharing in the conspicuous consumption.
16. Although petroleum, therefore, provides the resources for
fast economic expansion, this does not create an economic
structure that is diversified or independent,or asocial structure
that is either equitable or stable. The petroleum producer has
consequently, little defence against the inevitable decline
in oil revenues (just as a heroin addict finds the withdrawal 
d)agonising.) '
17. Since the explicit policy objective, of the government is
usually precisely to create a viable socio-economic structure -
and on paper, of course, this would be perfectly possible - one
might well wonder why political processes do not cure these
distortions. In the first place, especially in the smaller
countries, the authorities play a passive role vis-a-vis
foreign corporations,vhich pay whatever salaries and wages they
choose and with which the initiative on all major questions
lies - where to explore and at what rate, and the rate of
extraction. The pattern and pace are naturally set by the
worldwide policies of the company not by the needs of the
country concerned. Company managers can compel compliance with
their wishes, by threatening to reduce exploration or
extraction sharply, if "the climate for investment" is considered
unfavourable. The government is essentially powerless to
control them; not merely is it dependent on them for foreign
exchange and revenue, it has less expertise in almost every
respect - geological, engineering, chemical, legal, economic,
financial, fiscal, even public relations. This is especially true 
of the smaller petroleum countries.
1) If one can make any prediction in the social sciences it 
is that the economic landscape of the 2lst century will be 
littered with the relics of petroleum economies.
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18. This picture is somewhat modified where governments have 
built up a technical corps and a public corporation runs the 
industry, especially where there is a strong personality (such 
as Mattei) in charge of this corporation. However, 
such a corps is essentially a satellite of the multinationals, 
not merely in its pattern of consumption and even its attitudes, 
but because it relies on overseas sources to replenish its 
expertise. Typically there are no research institutes locally 
in the petroleum field (even on the structure and objectives
of the multinational), no professional periodicals, little 
reference to oil (still less the wdder field of energy) in 
secondary education - and not much even in most university 
departments, vdiich copy overseas syllabuses and import foreign 
teachers and textbooks.
19. The national petroleum corporation in any case relies 
heavily on foreign corporations to market the oil and on foreign 
consultants. Moreover, it is not necessarily really under 
state control ~ it can become "a state within a state", because 
of its strong bargaining position, determining the rate of 
extraction, setting its own salaries, branching out into other 
sectors. It can even make its own trade agreements, develop
a security force and acquire assets overseas (not necessarily 
in corporate ownership).
20. The second political reason why a petroleum economy 
develops an unviable form is that there are simple resources to 
repress those who favour changes of strategy, and to
repel invasion. Typically the number of tanks per
million of the population is very high, and the police are 
provided with all that modern technology has to offer. In the 
mini states, political pressures can be flared off by providing 
all possible malcontents (except of course non-citizens) with 
a high level of living.
2 1 .} -r act j i a substantial fraction of the population^including the petroleum v7orkers) lives in such comfort, or has expectations of doing so, that it has little
desire for change. Indeed the mood of public life in petroleum
country is euphoric (oddly so in view of its intractable
problems) - like that of a group which has collectively won the
2)big prize in a football pool.
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22. The capacity for political adjustment is also reduced by 
the tranquilising effect of paternalism. The citizens of a 
petroleum country find that the way to obtain a house or a 
professional education or even a major surgical operation is 
not to organise political pressure to obtain access to the 
social services for one’s area, tribe, class, etc. nor even to 
work and save for it, but to acquire the skill of manipulating 
the bureaucracy. Despite all this, in most petroleum countries 
there are sections of the public with a grasp of the country’s 
basic problems, and the will to try and solve them, especially 
to achieve a degree of national autonomy.
23. But a final political constraint is the heavy foreign
influence. Governments of petroleum exporters are dependent
on a few foreign countries for markets, technology and armaments,
and do not have a great deal of room to manoeuvre, whatever
the appearances. In particular, even if they wished to do so,
they could not use their resources to create a lasting power
base - by, for example, making petroleum supplies conditional3)on a degree of control over atomic energy development.
1) The euphoria may, however, have an intangible (and unmeasurable) 
economic effect, by inducing entrepreneurial attitudes (the 
’’super-multiplier” referred to by Mackay) .
2) In other respects this analogy fits. There is little in 
their past experience to prepare either oil exporters or the pool 
winners for the total change in circumstances and they may well 
dissipate their windfall in a level of consumption that cannot
be sustained, especially since they are likely to have no real 
plan for acquiring assets (some of which are worthless IOUs written 
by distant relatives).
3) The pattern of foreign investment by the mini-states in 
particular (a bundle of loans, bonds, equity shares in a dozen 
countries, etc.) seems to show little sign of a coherent set of 
objectives, even nationally let alone regionally. The high 
profits of the ’’energy crisis” will therefore provide neither^ 
strategic influence in the economies of the industrial counmies 
nor a new centre of industry and technology in the Middle East.
They seem not to care whether history once more passes them by.
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24. The appropriate model for analysing these problems is one 
of "dualism" (without necessarily accepting all the analysis 
carried out in its name). Socially, just as economically and 
politically, the focus of the analysis lies in the intrusion of 
a foreign-oriented (in some cases foreign-controlied) sector into 
a traditional community, and on the tensions which are generated. 
While the model may throw light on policy issues, it is not 
fundamentally policy-oriented: in it the attitudes and decisions
of policymakers are dependent variables, determined by forces 
over which they have little control and indeed which deprive them 
of the wish for control. Nevertheless, the oil producer is a 
fascinating subject for the social scientists because it shows 
marked dependence and false perception in every field.
»
Application to Scotland
25* How much does this scenario apply to Scotland? It would 
be presumptious of me to suggest any conclusions but I can at 
least raise some questions.
26. In some obvious ways Scotland is basically different from 
OPEC members. The fact is that she is not a primarily rural 
country at the start of oil development. She is much better 
placed for the social impact, and has the capacity to develop 
the engineering sector to be a supplier to the oil industry 
not only in Scotland but elsewhere too.
27. As in most countries, "dualism" can be found in Scotland - 
with the Highlands and Islands showing lower wages and higher 
unemployment than the Lowlands, and different cultural patterns. 
In contrast, however, to say Venezuela or Iran at the time of 
the impact of petroleum, Scotland’s rural areas are well 
supplied with teachers and doctors.
28. Another major difference is political. Scotland does not 
have sovereignty. From the point of view of the United Kingdom 
as a whole, oil production offers the prospect of much needed 
relief to the balance of payments, and Scotland presumably 
benefits to the same extent as all regions of Britain - but
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no more so. Moreover, Scotland has no greater claim on the oil 
revenues than any other region, and thus enjoys less social and 
economic development than she would if all the revenue flowed to 
her.
29. Scotland’s share of the oil revenue depends largely on 
political developments. At one extreme, she may emerge as an 
independent country with total control of the revenues; at the 
other she would remain in the United Kingdom and do no better
than say Devon and Cornwall. There are various other possibilities
between - she could receive a specific share of the revenues
(though the Treasury would strongly resist this), or she could
acquire the power to levy taxes or quasi-taxes (as Alberta does,
and now Shetland), or she could receive a larger share of oil
revenues than other regions by explicit or implicit concession
that she had some right to it (as Sarawak does in Malaysia for
example). The last is the most likely outcome, at least in the
near future; it is foreshadowed by the relatively generous
1)provision for the Scottish Development Agency.
30. Can anything be said about the likely future relation 
between Scottish nationalism and the Parliamentary scene at 
Westminster? - only perhaps that steps like the setting up of 
the Scottish Assembly usually tend to reinforce rather than 
assuage the power of nationalism. Other imponderables hang 
over the political future. Would the capacity of Scotland to 
reconstruct its economy be inhibited by British membership of 
EEC (allowing of course, for the possible future form of the 
Community)? Would the bargaining power of a seller of oil be 
weakened by the obligation to offer it to other members of 
the Community? And will these restrictions be more or less 
serious if Scotland were her self a separate member of EEC?
31. Despite the special characteristics of Scotland, the 
discussion above of the experience of other oil producers raises 
some pertinent questions. Will, for example, the country’s
1) It could be argued that the setting up of the corresponding 
agency for Wales shows that petroleum has nothing to do with this 
bat this could be a case where Wales has benefitted indirectly 
from what the Government decided to do for Scottish nationalism,
the strength of which reflects the oil boom.
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"dualism" be deepened? The first impact of oil in Scotland has 
been in fact to modify what dualism there is, since most of the 
harbours and construction sites affected by oil development lie 
in Highland and Islands. However, when the construction phase 
runs down and the oil is flowing in volume, this region will 
not necessarily get any greater benefit than say Clydeside.
It may well get no larger share of oil revenues, and be bypassed 
by the industrial expansion that readily accessible oil and gas 
make possible.
32. It is true that the Scottish Assembly, especially if it 
acquires real power, could consciously attempt to moderate 
dualism. But is this in fact likely? Will not Lowland political 
interests dominate it? The urban sector dominates the political 
scene in most other oil producers, even in those where the bulk
of the population still live in rural areas (which is certainly 
not the case in Scotland).
33. There are several reasons, however, why dualism is unlikely 
to increase greatly, even in an independent Scotland. The fiscal 
system is highly developed, and will spread the oil revenues 
around, wherever they are paid. In addition, wage levels, even 
in rural areas, are already such that it would be unthinkable 
for the petroleum sector, or the industries which supply it, to 
pay wages 20 or 30 times as high as the going wage. Wage control, 
which is bound to continue in some form, whatever the constitutional 
future, will prevent very high wages being paid, especially in 
those industries which benefit from oil but are already in existence. 
In any case, the highly organised trade union system will insist
on the maintenance of "relativity" between wages in different 
areas and in different jobs.
34. The question is rather whether there is sufficient flexibility 
to permit the structural changes necessary if Scotland is to take 
full advantage of the development of oil to build a new and viable 
economic structure. It may be difficult to pay nurses or bus 
drivers enough to induce them to move to a different part of the 
country. Firms constructing modules or making petrochemicals
may not be able to pay workers from industries which are stagnant
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enough to attract them - especially if the latter industries are 
kept alive artificially by government subsidies such as injections 
of capital. If Scotland received the full force of the oil revenues, 
this would be a still more acute issue.
35* Will diversification be inhibited by an overvalued exchange
rate? This is unlikely so long as Scotland shares the same currency
with Britain, which has a foreign exchange crisis so fundamental
that the oil revenues will merely help prop up the pound. The
currency of an independent Scotland could well, however, become
overvalued. It is true that the bigger structural change which
would occur if Scotland received the whole of the oil revenue
would probably mean faster inflation, in view of the rigidity
of the socio-economic structure, but this would not necessarily
1)weaken a currency supported by huge oil revenues.
36. Will Scottish political processes be shaped by oil euphoria?
The dangers and opportunities alike are fewer. It would seem, 
however, that the greater the devolution of power, the greater the 
risk of this happening. Britain as a whole shows little signs of 
oil euphoria. Indeed the problem is quite the reverse: the
British public shows little interest in the implications of 
discovering a new7 source of energy, and still less understanding 
of the issues raised by this.
37. Will the multinationals dominate the oil sector? Certainly
the United Kingdom government has the technical capacity to deal 
2 )with them ' even if it has not been very successful in finding the 
right terms for exploration licenses. Would an independent, or 
more autonomous, Scotland be more likely to control the multi­
nationals or would it fall to a degree under their domination?
Provided it avoided this fate, it would no doubt exercise the 
power it had, e.g. over the rate of extraction, more in Scotland’s 
interest - which would presumably lie in a slower rate than suits 
Britain as a whole. (A slower rate would give more time to absorb 
the social impact and to build up oil-related industries, as well 
as postponing the day when output starts to fall).
1) In Nigeria, civil service salaries and wages have approximately 
doubled in the past year, stimulating big increases in other sectors, 
but the exchange rate does not reflect this. .
2) This is made somewhat easier by the fact that one of the c re
companies is British (EP) and another partly so (Shell)*
fact in part government-owned.
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38. Will a national planning organisation emerge, that would 
seize hold of this opportunity - with the resources, professional 
expertise and leadership to decide which industries to develop 
where? The greater the degree of political autonomy the bigger 
the chance of this happening, though the probability of a really 
able industrial leader appearing is naturally less the smaller 
the population.
39. To sum up, the danger of Scotland’s long-term future being 
shattered by oil is much less than for OPEC members. However, 
the greater the autonomy she gets, the greater these dangers 
will be - though the greater will also be the oil revenues and 
the opportunities.
40. It is, of course, very rash for a "foreigner” to venture 
into the political minefield of Scottish nationalism. However, 
this seems the only way of opening up the real issues of the 
research needs.
41. Clearly these are huge. Clearly also, they are inter­
disciplinary - the social impact depends on economic and political 
developments. It is obvious too that while some research needs to 
be policy-oriented, some also needs to be on longer-term strategic 
issues and some more fundamental - indeed to study the processes 
of policymaking and the makers themselves.
DS/RMT
17 March 1975.
\
